Confidentiality using Symmetric Key Encryption

CSS 322 – Security and Cryptography

Contents

- Implementing on a network
- Distributing keys
- Random number generators

Where to Encrypt?

- Traditionally, encryption is used to provide confidentiality (privacy) of information
- For network communications, where should encryption/decryption take place?



Confidentiality Attacks

- An attacker can listen to communications from many places:
 - On the LAN computers both locally and remotely (e.g. log in to LAN from outside via modem)
 - Wiring closet (or similar) used in buildings
 - Network hardware such as routers and switches on the LAN
 - Network hardware in ISP and Telco networks
 - Communication links
 - Especially wireless/satellite
 - Fibre optics are harder to attack without detection

Link versus End-to-End Encryption

- Link Encryption
- Encrypt/decrypt at endpoints of each link
- Requires many encrypt/decrypt devices
- Requires *all* links to use encryption
- Must decrypt/encrypt at each device in path
 - Message is vulnerable at switches (Layer 2 devices)
- E.g. ATM or MPLS switch has a unique key with each of its neighbour switches

- End-to-end Encryption
- Encrypt/decrypt at source/destination hosts
- Hosts do not have to rely on network operators Only data can be encrypted – header information is needed for routers/switches to determine where to send message
 - Vulnerable to traffic analysis
- Message vulnerable at gateways between systems e.g. Internet to phone network

Best to use a combination of link and end-to-end encryption!

Encryption at Different Layers

(a) Application-Level Encryption (on links and at routers and gateways)

Link-H Net-H IP-H TCP-H	Data	Link-T
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On links and at routers

Link-H Net-H IP-H	ТСР-Н	Data	Link-T
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In gateways

(b) TCP-Level Encryption

On links

Link-H	Net-H	IP-H	ТСР-Н	Data	Link-T
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In routers and gateways

(c) Link-Level Encryption

Traffic Analysis Attacks

- Even with encrypted messages, users may want to hide traffic patterns
- Traffic patterns can reveal:
 - Who is communicating
 - How often they are communicating
 - Types of communications, e.g. message lengths, number of messages, time of communications
 - Correlation between events (in real world) and communications
- Hiding patterns using link encryption
 - Network (IP) and application headers already encrypted
 - Traffic padding: send ciphertext continuously, even when no plaintext. Attacker does not know when real plaintext is sent
- Hiding patterns using end-to-end encryption
 - Much harder. Can send null messages to hide patterns

Key Distribution

- Until now, we assumed encrypt symmetric key was available at encrypting host and decrypting host
- Security of symmetric key systems relies on key secrecy
- How do we securely distribute this key?
 - 1. A can physically deliver to B
 - 2. Third party, C, can physically deliver to A and B
 - 3. If A and B already have a key, can securely transmit new key to each other, encrypted with old key
 - 4. If A and B have secure connection with third party C, C can securely send keys to A and B

How Many Keys?

- If N entities, each pair must have unique key:
 - Number of keys = [N(N-1)]/2
- Link encryption
 - Option 1 and 2 are possible, e.g. a switch only exchanges keys with its neighbours (10 to 100 keys)
- End-to-end encryption at IP
 - Number of hosts = 1000; approx 500,000 keys
- End-to-end encryption at application level
 - Number of users/processes = 10,000; approx 50,000,000 keys
- For end-to-end encryption, option 4 is used

Key Distribution Centres

Each host shares a master key with the KDC (e.g. physical distribution of M_A between KDC and A, and M_B between KDC and B)

Only N (e.g. 1000) master keys required – 1 for each host

- For session (e.g. download, voice call) between A and B, KDC generates a session key, $\rm S_{A,B}$
 - $S_{A,B}$ sent to A and B encrypted with corresponding master keys
- Session encrypted with session key S_{A,B}



KDC Example



KDC Issues

- Can use more than one KDC
 - In large networks use hierarchy of KDCs; but most trust each other
- Session key lifetime
 - Short lifetime is good; means less time using 1 key, less chance of attacker to analyse ciphertext and plaintext
 - But session key distribution does involve some overhead; need a reasonable trade-off
- KDC must be trusted and protected
 - There are ways for making KDC distributed for smaller networks
- Good practice to use different sessions keys can be used for applications/purposes

Decentralised Key Distribution

- No need for third party C
 - Don't have to trust someone else
- But need many master keys, one for each pair:
 - [N(N-1)]/2 master keys



Random Numbers in Security

- Random numbers are used by many security algorithms:
 - Session key generation in KDC
 - Generation of keys for RSA
 - Handshaking to prevent replay attacks in key distribution
- What is a random number? Two important criteria are:
 - Randomness
 - Uniform distribution: frequency of occurrence of numbers should be about the same (easy to test)
 - Independence: no value can be inferred from any other value (harder to prove)
 - Unpredictability
 - If truly independent, then unpredictable
 - In practice, must be careful that cannot predict patterns and future numbers in a random sequence

Testing for Randomness

- Several different tests can be applied:
 - Number of 1's and 0's in entire sequence should be equal
 - Number of 1's and 0's in M-bit blocks should be equal
 - Analyse the runs of 1's (or 0's) how many consecutive 1's
 - Matrix, fast Fourier Transform and other mathematical tests abut patterns
 - Compression: it should not be able to be compressed

- ...

Random Number Generators

- How do we (and especially computers) generate random numbers?
- Use deterministic algorithms to calculate pseudo-random numbers
 - Hence, Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNG)
- Most widely used PRNG is the linear congruential method

Linear Congruential Generator

- Sequence of random numbers $\{X_n\}$ generated from:
 - -m, the modulus: m > 0
 - -a, the multiplier: 0 < a < m
 - -c, the increment: $0 \le c < m$
 - $-X_0$, the seed: $0 \le X_0 \le m$

$$X_{n+1} = (aX_n + c) \mod m$$

- Choice of a, c and m is critical in getting random sequence
 - Sequence should be as long as possible, hence *m* very large
 - *m* should be close to the largest nonnegative integer
 - Tests have shown that if *m* is prime, *c* is 0, then only several values of *a* are appropriate, e.g. $7^5 = 16807$
 - For 32-bit computer: $X_{n+1} = (aX_n) \mod (2^{31} 1)$
- Problem: once parameters are known, an attacker can determine the sequence of random numbers

Other PRNGs

- Cryptographical PRNGs
 - Use encryption algorithms (aim of encryption is produce 'random looking' ciphertext)
 - Cyclic encryption
 - Use incremental counter as input into encryption algorithm (e.g. DES)
 - ANSI X9.17
 - Uses the current date/time and 64-bit seed as input to 3DES
 - Used in financial applications and PGP
 - Blum Blum Shub generator and others ...
- True Random Number Generators
 - Use a nondeterministic source, such as radiation measurements and leaky capacitors
 - Require additional hardware for measurements
- Use published collections of random numbers (in books and on web sites)_{CSS 322 - Security and Cryptography}

ANSI X9.17

- Used in PGP and financial applications
- Uses Triple DES and Date/Time (DT) value as input

